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Effects of groups and government size on information 
disclosure 
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper uses data from Japan to ascertain the determinants of 
government information disclosures by considering the role of special interest groups 
and government size. A IV-Tobit model is employed to control for endogeneity bias of 
government size. The major findings are as follows: (1) special interest groups have a 
detrimental effect on information disclosure; (2) special interest groups and an aging 
population increase government size; and (3) information disclosure ordinances are 
more likely to be enacted with a large government size. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the central tenets of public choice theory is that associations have a tendency 
to act as special interest groups, which lobby for preferential policy at the expense of the 
rest of society. A special interest group represents a narrow segment of society and is 
unlikely to have an incentive to make any significant sacrifices for the interests of 
society as a whole. ―The organizations are … therefore overwhelmingly oriented to 
struggle over the distribution of income and wealth rather than to the production of 
additional output‖ (Olson 1982, p. 44). Such groups engage in rent-seeking activities 
and are considered to act as distributional coalitions. Various organizations and 
associations can be considered special interest groups, and can lead to government 
failure.  
It is widely accepted that imperfect information, such as information asymmetry 
between seller and buyers, is a key element of market failure. Information asymmetry 
is considered to have a detrimental effect not only on the market but also on political 
processes, and when it exists between citizens and government it enables politicians, 
bureaucrats, and special interest groups to seek their own benefits at the expense of 
other citizens. When citizens wish to access information regarding government activity 
the cost is high. In other words, it is difficult for citizens to acquire sufficient 
government information relating to, for instance, the provision of public services or 
subsidies. Hence, rational citizens become ignorant. This may be the reason why 
citizens are not able to criticize the corrupt behavior of politicians and bureaucrats. To 
put it differently, ―the government’s power to pursue its own objectives is greatly aided 
by the ―rational ignorance‖ of voters of their true tax bills, the full impact of debt, and 
money creation‖ (Mueller 2003, p. 382). The pressure on government from citizens 
declines, which decreases the incentive of government to maximize social welfare.  
Public policies are thought to play a critical role in reducing information asymmetry. 
It seems plausible that policies that reduce information asymmetry also increase the 
net benefits of society as a whole rather than just the members of special groups. 
However, results from empirical works have produced conflicting views. Opinions are 
divergent on the effect of information disclosure. The seminal work of Islam (2006) used 
the existence of freedom of information acts and the length of time they were in 
existence to measure government transparency. Islam’s (2006) study used cross-country 
data from 199 countries to provide evidence that countries with greater transparency 
achieve better governance.1 Then, Benito and Bastida (2009) followed and argued that 
                                                   
1 Various indexes are used to measure the degree of governance: ―governance 
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―the more information the budget discloses, the less the politicians can use fiscal deficit 
to achieve opportunistic goals.‖ In India, the Right to Information Act came into effect in 
2005, and citizens can now access information under the control of public authorities. 
Bhattacharyya and Jha (2009) showed that the Right to Information Act and economic 
growth reduced corruption in India. In contrast, Escaleras et al. (2010) used panel data 
from 128 countries during the period 1984–2003 to suggest that the enactment of 
freedom of information acts caused the level of corruption to reduce in developing 
countries. There is a possibility of reverse causality, whereby economic conditions affect 
government transparency. There are also studies that explore the reasons behind 
government transparency. For instance, Alt et al. (2006) attempted to ascertain the 
determinants of fiscal transparency in the United States. Based on panel data, they 
presented evidence that political competition and power sharing produced fiscal 
transparency. In addition, past fiscal conditions were also shown to affect the level of 
transparency (Alt et al. 2006).  
To advance the member interests of a special interest group, the group aims to 
influence the approval process of public policy. The political power of these groups is 
thought to be inevitably related to the direction of the public policy adopted. Hence, 
members of special interest groups are thought to engage in collective action to hinder 
information disclosure because information disclosure would be detrimental to the 
vested interests of its members. Furthermore, government size is also considered to 
affect information disclosure policies. Government size appears to have the opposite 
effect on information disclosure. The larger a government becomes, the greater the 
benefits of public works. This results in a delay of information disclosure legislation. 
However, the larger the government becomes, the greater the tax burdens on the 
country’s citizens. This provides an incentive for those citizens who do not enjoy the 
benefits of public works to criticize the government. It follows then that citizens come to 
prefer information disclosure. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate the effect of 
government size on information disclosure. 
Since the 1990s in Japan, an increasing number of local governments have enacted 
public information disclosure ordinances (IDOs). The purpose of the ordinance 
enactments is to assure fair governance, ensuring that government activity becomes 
more transparent and that citizens’ participation and local autonomy is enhanced (Uga 
2001). The enactment of IDOs appears to reduce the likelihood of government failure. 
With the aim of exploring the behavior of interest groups in the political process, it is 
                                                                                                                                                     
effectiveness,‖ ―voice and accountability,‖ ―regulatory burden,‖ and ―perception of 
corruption‖ (Islam 2006). 
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useful to investigate how such groups exert pressure on policy choice in Japan. This 
paper uses local government level data from Japan. In comparison with cross-country 
data, the data used in this paper is less likely to suffer omitted variables bias caused by 
unobserved historical and cultural backgrounds because these backgrounds are the 
same within a country. Furthermore, Japanese society is considered to be relatively 
homogenous in terms of social and cultural conditions, although there has been a recent 
increase in the number of immigrants into the country (Yamamura 2012). Hence, the 
advantage of using such data is that it is less likely to be affected by heterogeneous 
factors than more heterogeneous countries such as India.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the number of interest groups on 
the enactment of IDOs. Further, a IV-Tobit model is used to control for endogeneity bias 
of government size. In this model, government size and the rate of enactment of IDOs 
are examined at the same time. The key findings of these estimations are: (1) the 
number of special interest groups is positively associated with the rate of enactment of 
IDOs; (2) the number of special interest groups and the aging population rate increase 
government size; and (3) government size is positively associated with the rate of 
enactment of IDOs. Section 2 provides a brief overview regarding the disclosure of local 
government information in Japan. Section 3 presents the testable hypotheses. In 
Section 4, the data and methods used are explained. Section 5 discusses the results of 
the estimations. The final section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Overview of information disclosure ordinances in Japan  
The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in the United States in 1967. 
Approximately 30 years later in 1999, Japan’s central government enacted similar 
information disclosure legislation. Prior to the recent responsibilities of the central 
government, local governments in Japan (in towns and villages) played a leading role in 
the disclosure of public information. In 1982, a town in northeastern Japan, Kanayama, 
became the first to enact an information-disclosure ordinance (Muroi 1999). 
The enactment of IDOs was aimed to signify the regulations of a particular local 
government, providing residents the right to request the disclosure of information 
possessed by that body. Figure 1 reveals that the rate of enactment of IDOs significantly 
increased from 1998 to 2004. The rate of enactment was only 0.2 in 1998, increasing 
notably to 0.9 by 2004.2,3 The enactment of public information ordinances is anticipated 
                                                   
2 This rate would become 1 if all local governments enacted such ordinances. 
3 Since 2005, the annexation of municipalities, towns, and villages has rapidly 
increased. As a result, the number of municipalities, towns, and villages decreased to 
approximately 2,300 and 1,800 in 2005 and 2009, respectively. Accordingly, the rate of 
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to ensure local government accountability in towns, village, and municipalities. IDOs 
are based on the right to know (Muroi 1999).  
IDOs were anticipated to enable citizens to identify the fraudulent interests of 
politicians, bureaucrats, or private firms. For example, public funds were sometimes 
used for undesirable ends such as cheating and collusion. Figure 1 shows that before the 
mid-1990s information disclosure systems were not well developed in of the majority of 
Japan’s local governments. For instance, bureaucrats often claimed expenses for 
business trips that were not actually undertaken, but this was not disclosed to citizens. 
In the early 1990s, politicians were often also company managers, even though they 
were prohibited by law from engaging in side businesses. To take a typical case, it was 
commonly observed that firms managed by politicians frequently received orders for 
construction work from local governments (Asano 2010). Within the political process, 
which was not open to citizens, subsidies were provided purposely to sectors with strong 
electoral leverage, and local governments spent extravagantly on public works projects.  
The enactment of information disclosure ordinances revealed the illicit use of public 
funds, which were equal to 4 billion yen in 1998 (Muroi 1999, p. 106). As a result of the 
introduction of an information disclosure system, the process by which, for example, 
suppliers of public services are appointed has become transparent and the 
inappropriate behavior of politicians can be deterred. Thanks to the system, citizens are 
able to scrutinize possible collusion among politicians, bureaucrats, and private firms. 
Consequently, in a number of prefectures, the practice of local bureaucrats using public 
funds to entertain central bureaucrats has been (in principle) abolished (Matsui 2000, p. 
6). The details of bureaucrats’ business trips are now open to the public (Matsui 2000, p. 
6). Hence, IDOs have made a great contribution to deterring moral hazards and the 
misallocation of resources. Accordingly, the efficiency of local government is considered 
improved.4  
It follows from this discussion that public IDOs have played a critical role in 
increasing the welfare of citizens. In contrast, however, those groups who enjoyed the 
benefits of a lack of information disclosure are now disgruntled with the enactment of 
the ordinances. That is, politicians, bureaucrats, and special interest groups have 
                                                                                                                                                     
municipalities enacting ordinances rose from 0.97 in 2005 to 0.99 in 2009. Thus, the 
annexation of municipalities is considered to be positively related to the rate of enacting 
ordinances. That is, the rate of enacting disclosure ordinances is partly affected by the 
annexation of municipalities. From 2005 to 2009, the change in the rate of enacting 
disclosure ordinances was negligible. Therefore, I focus on the 1998–2004 period in this 
paper. 
4 It has been shown that the government’s public information disclosure is positively 
associated with GDP growth in Japan (Yamamura 2010). 
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appeared to lose the benefits of information asymmetry between local government and 
citizens. Hence, they seem intent on initiating collective actions to oppose the disclosure 
of public information. In the process of enacting information disclosure legislation, 
bureaucrats have in fact emasculated the law (Tsuruoka and Asaoka 1997). 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
Within a political system, a government can be considered to be a monopolist. Local 
governments can acquire an amount of information that is distinctly greater than that 
available to the citizenry. However, there are no rivals to the local governments, to 
reduce efforts to improve the government services supplied to the citizens as a whole. 
Partly because of the information asymmetry between governments and citizens, 
politicians and bureaucrats have a tendency to place higher priority on their own profits 
than on citizens’ welfare, resulting in various undesirable outcomes for society as a 
whole. When an official IDO is enacted, citizens are able to collect information 
regarding governmental activity. Once citizens are able to access such information, they 
are more inclined than before to criticize policies that advance politicians’ and 
bureaucrats’ self-interests. Citizens are able to vote in the election for the candidate who 
increases the benefits to citizens rather than interest groups. This creates competitive 
pressure for politicians. As a result, budget allocations have become more efficient, and 
this in turn increases citizens’ welfare. In contrast, special interest groups lose the 
vested interest of their members through rent-seeking activity. That is, thanks to the 
disclosure of public information by governments, there is an increase in the benefits for 
the whole of society whereas the vested interests of special interest groups are reduced. 
Inevitably, special interest groups have a strong incentive to prevent public IDOs from 
being enacted. Members of special interest groups may take collective action against the 
ordinance. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is proposed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Special interest groups impede the disclosure of public information by 
governments.  
The influence of government size on the enactment of IDOs can be considered 
differently. Alternative hypotheses are proposed below. Citizens become the ―rational 
ignorant‖ when the cost of collecting information regarding political issues is greater 
than the benefit of collecting it and voting. Rational ignorance leads to citizens poorly 
monitoring governmental activities. This is considered as the principal-agent problem 
between government and citizens. However, information regarding government size is 
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easily obtained by citizens. To put it another way, the cost of accessing information 
regarding government size is low and citizens do not become the ―rational ignorant.‖ 
Niskanen (1971) asserted that bureaucrats aim to maximize the budget rather than 
social welfare. Assuming that government size is large, citizens with information 
regarding government size will infer that a large government is positively associated 
with their burdens (i.e., tax). If government size exceeds the optimal level of scale 
maximizing the net benefit of citizens, citizens will reduce government size to the 
optimal level. Accordingly, citizens are willing to make government more transparent to 
collect accurate information regarding public expenditure for the purpose of avoiding 
wasteful spending. Thus, I postulate the following Hypothesis 2(a): 
 
Hypothesis 2(a): The level of disclosure of public information by governments is likely 
to be greater in a larger government?.  
 
In contrast, there is another possibility regarding the effect of government size on the 
enactment of IDOs. The larger the government size, the greater the number of people 
who work in public sectors or who receive benefits from the public sector. IDOs are 
considered to make a government more efficient by reducing its size. As a consequence, 
people working in the public sector or related industries appear to lose the benefit. For 
instance, some public sectors will be downsized and so workers will lose their jobs. If 
this holds true, then public sector employees will resolutely oppose IDOs. This leads me 
to raise Hypothesis 2(b) as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2(b): The level of disclosure of public information by governments is likely 
to be greater in a smaller government?.  
 
4. Data and method 
 
4.1. Data  
Within Japan’s administrative system, municipalities, towns, and villages represent 
the lowest levels of local government. During the study period, 1998–2004, there were 
approximately 3,200 local governments within the municipalities, towns, and villages in 
Japan’s 47 prefectures.5  Thus, there are approximately 68 local governments per 
prefecture. 
                                                   
5 A Japanese prefecture is roughly the administrative equivalent of an American state 
or Canadian province. 
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Proxy variables data for the interest groups were collected from the Establishment 
and Enterprise Census provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications Statistics Bureau. Various categories of organizations are contained in 
the census. In this paper, proxy variables of the interest groups are (1) cooperative 
associations6 and (2) political and business organizations. These variables are used 
because these organizations are established in part to act as special interest groups to 
lobby for preferential policies. The number of political and business organizations per 
population is denoted as Political group, while the number of cooperative associations 
per population is represented by Cooperative group. These groups are organized for 
special interest purposes. Political group and Cooperative group are incorporated to 
examine the effects of interest groups on government information disclosure. Table 2 
shows the correlation coefficient between Political group and Information disclosure as 
–0.06 despite being statistically insignificant. In contrast, the correlation coefficient 
between Cooperative group and Information disclosure is –0.21 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These results imply that Political group is not significantly 
associated with the enactment of IDOs, whereas Political group is significantly 
associated with the enactment of IDOs. However, the correlation coefficient is 
calculated when the trend of the enactment of IDOs illustrated in Figure 1 is not 
controlled. To remove the trend effect, I included Figures 2(1) and (2). A cursory 
examination of Figures 2(1) and 2(2) reveals that Political group and Cooperative group 
are negatively associated with Information disclosure even after controlling for year 
dummies to capture the trends of Information disclosure. What is observed in Figures 
2(1) and 2(2) is consistent with Hypothesis 1. For a closer examination of Hypothesis 1, 
Tobit and IV-Tobit models were used and these results are discussed later. 
Government party was calculated based on the data from the dataset on prefectural 
assembly, which is available to the public via Yosuke Sunahara’s website.7 Population 
censuses (1990, 2000), as published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, provided data regarding the number of people who graduated from 
universities over the past 10 years; for the period 1990–2000, the data for 1998 to 2000 
were generated by interpolations based on the assumption of constantly changing rates 
between 1990 and 2000. The data between 2001 and 2004 were calculated by adding the 
annual number of people who graduated from university between 2001 and 2004. The 
                                                   
6 In the Establishment and Enterprise Census, cooperative associations include (a) 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing cooperative associations and (b) business cooperative 
associations. 
7  Available from http://www.geocities.jp/yosuke_sunahara/data/data.html (accessed 
November 18, 2010, Japanese only). 
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annual data between 2001 and 2004 were collected from the Basic Report for Schools 
(2001–2004) published by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology. The number of people who graduated from university and population data 
were used to calculate the rate of university graduation. Other variables such as Female 
rate, GDP, Old population, and Young population are gathered from the Asahi Shimbun 
newspaper (2008). Definitions and the basic statistics of the variables used in this paper 
are presented in Table 1. 
 
4.2. Methods 
 
To examine the hypotheses raised previously, the estimated function takes the following 
form: 
Information disclosure it = 0 + 1 Government size it + 2 Political groupit + 
3Cooperative group it + 4Government party it + ５Female rate it + 6Ln(GDP)it + 
7Educationit + ut + εit, 
 
where the dependent variable is Information disclosure it in prefecture i, for year t. 
The regression parameters are denoted by  and ut represents the unobservable 
year-specific effects of year t to capture the trends demonstrated in Figure 1. The effect 
of ut is controlled for by including year dummies. The error term is represented by εit. 
The structure of the data covers 6 years for 47 prefectures. The value of Information 
disclosure becomes 1 when all local governments enact an IDO in a prefecture, and it 
becomes 0 when no local governments enact the IDO in a prefecture. Table 1 shows that 
the maximum value of Information disclosure is 1 and its minimum value is 0.01. This 
means that some observations of Information disclosure are censored at 1 (upper bound). 
Therefore, a Tobit model is appropriate in this situation and is used for the estimations. 
The effects of the key variables in examining Hypotheses 1 and 2(a) and (b) are as 
follows: Hypothesis 1 creates the expectation that the coefficient sign of Political group 
and Cooperative group will be positive; Hypothesis 2(a) predicts that the coefficient 
signs of Government size will be positive; and Hypothesis 2(b) predicts that the 
coefficient signs of Government size will be negative.  
Control variables such as Government party and Female rate are incorporated to 
capture the influence of political factors on IDO enactment. The Liberal Democratic 
party (LDP), supported by conservative people, has been the ruling party in Japan since 
the end of World War II. Government party represents rate of seats held by the LDP in 
the local assembly. Government party has a significant influence on political 
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decision-making and on the allocation of budget. Special interest groups are able to 
enjoy their vested interests via rent-seeking activity to provide a benefit to the LDP. 
However, IDOs are considered to deter such rent-seeking activity and so reduce the 
vested interests. Therefore, LDP supporters are predicted to be against the enactment 
of IDOs. Even if Political group and Cooperative group are included as independent 
variables, the influence of special interest groups has not been completely captured. 
Hence, Government party is incorporated to capture the influence of special interest 
groups that enjoy benefits by supporting the LDP. The above argument leads to the 
prediction that the coefficient of Government party will take the negative sign. 
Within traditional Japanese society, females have held a lower social position than 
that of males, and women therefore play a minor role in the political process. This 
situation has persisted since the World War II, although the position of females has 
improved. IDOs have possibly changed the situation for females and have increased 
their benefit by reducing the political power of males. Hence, females are likely to 
support IDOs. Thus, Female rate is predicted to take the positive sign. Demand for 
information disclosure possibly depends on economic conditions captured by, for 
instance, GDP per capita and education level. A certain level of intelligence is required 
to understand and utilize the information disclosed by IDOs. Information accessed by 
the enactment of IDOs appears to be more valuable for people with higher levels of 
education. More educated people are able to use the information more effectively to 
increase social welfare and therefore prefer IDOs. Accordingly, the sign of the coefficient 
of Education is predicted to be positive. 
 
4.3. Endogeneity bias and instrumental variables 
IDOs are enacted for the purpose of reducing information asymmetry, resulting in 
more desirable outcomes—IDOs are aimed to increase the welfare of citizens. As argued 
previously, local government size is expected to affect the decision-making of local 
governments regarding the enactment of IDOs. Conversely, there is the possibility of 
reverse causality: the enactment of an IDO influences government size. Governmental 
public information disclosure is believed to make a government allocate resources more 
efficiently, thereby reducing the size of government if the result of the government 
activity is same.8 If this holds true, then the causality between the enactment of 
information disclosure and government size is considered ambiguous. Hence, the 
estimation results appear to suffer from endogeneity.  
                                                   
8 By using OECD data, Alt and Lassen (2006) provided evidence that fiscal 
transparency decreases debt accumulation. 
11 
 
This paper used a IV-Tobit model to control for endogeneity bias. Instrumental 
variables should influence the endogenous variable, but should not be related to the 
error term. Aged people are generally retired and are more likely to suffer poor health. 
Accordingly, benefit from social security is considered to be greater for older people. In 
contrast, the burden of social security lies heavily on the shoulders of the working 
generation. Therefore, older people are more inclined to prefer a larger government 
than working people. In addition, an increase in human capital for children is 
considered to increase their future earnings, which has positive effects on their utility. 
This, in turn, leads to an increase of utility for their parents (Becker 1981). Hence, for 
households with school-aged children, the benefits of public spending on education seem 
to be greater than the burden of spending. Households with school-aged children are 
considered to prefer a large government because public spending on education is 
positively associated with government size. It is for these reasons that Old population 
(rate of population over 65 years old) and Young population (rate of population between 
5 and 19 years old) are used as instrumental variables. 
The correlation matrix presented in Table 2 shows that the correlation coefficient 
between Government size and Old population is 0.62 and statistically significant at the 
1% level. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between Government size and Young 
population is 0.34 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the 
correlation coefficient is obtained when year-specific effects are not controlled for. For a 
closer examination, I now turn to Figures 3(1) and (2), which demonstrate the 
relationships between Government size and Old population, and Government size and 
Young population, after controlling for year dummies. Figure 3(1) reveals that Old 
Population is positively associated with Government size. In contrast, Figure 3(1) shows 
that Young Population is positively associated with Government size. The results 
illustrated in Figures 3(1) and (2) are in line with the prediction.  
 
5. Results 
 
The results of the Tobit model are shown in Table 3, and the results of the IV-Tobit are 
exhibited in Tables 4(1) and (2). As presented in Table 2, the correlation coefficient 
between Political group and Cooperative group is 0.66 and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This implies that Political group is positively related to Cooperative group. 
I interpret this as suggesting that Political group is more likely to exist in places where 
Cooperative group exists. This suggests that a collinearity between Political group and 
Cooperative group is observed in the regression estimation when both Political group 
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and Cooperative group are included at the same time. In Tables 3 and 4, with the aim of 
alleviating the effect of collinearity (in addition to the full model including Political 
group and Cooperative group), I also present alternative specifications that do not 
simultaneously include Political group and Cooperative group. Furthermore, as 
discussed in the previous section, Government size and Political group (and Cooperative 
group) are correlated, which leads to collinearity. Hence, in columns (1)–(3) of Table 3, 
the results of the alternative specifications that exclude Government size are presented. 
The results of the second stage estimations of the IV-Tobit model where Government 
size is considered as endogenous are shown in Table 4(1). The results of the first stage 
estimation of the IV-Tobit where Government size is a dependent variable are reported 
in Table 4(2).  
 
5.1. Tobit model. 
I now begin by looking at the key variables to test the Hypotheses. In columns (1) and 
(2), Political group yields the expected negative sign and is statistically significant, 
which is congruent with Hypothesis 1. However, as exhibited in columns (4) and (5), 
Political group becomes statistically insignificant although the sign of its coefficient 
continues to be negative once Government size is added as an independent variable. 
Concerning another variable related to Hypothesis 1, Cooperative group produces the 
predicted negative sign in columns (1) and (3), and is statistically significant in column 
(3), although it is insignificant in column (1). Further, the sign of the coefficient of 
Cooperative group becomes positive in columns (4) and (6), despite being statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, the results of Political group and Cooperative group are not 
robust, and are inconclusive. However, these results possibly suffer from omitted 
variable bias in columns (1)–(3) or endogeneity bias caused by Government size in 
columns (4)–(6). With respect to Government party, as predicted earlier, its coefficient 
sign is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns. This means 
that supporters of government party appear to be against IDOs to protect their vested 
interests. 
I now turn to Government size to test Hypotheses 2(a) and (b). I see from columns 
(4)–(6) that the coefficient of Government size takes the negative sign and is 
statistically significant. This supports Hypothesis 2(b). However, endogeneity bias 
possibly affected that result. Hence, it is necessary to examine more closely the effect of 
Government size by controlling for endogeneity bias. These results are discussed in 
sub-section 5.2.  
Concerning control variables, the coefficient of Female rate shows the mixed sign and 
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statistical insignificance. This suggests that IDOs are not affected by the female ratio in 
population. Ln(GDP) produces the positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. A significant negative sign for Education, with the exception of column (3), is 
contrary to the prediction. The result possibly suffers from estimation bias. Therefore, I 
will discuss the results of the IV-Tobit model later in the paper. With respect to year 
dummies, as shown Table 3, the reference group is 1999. Hence, the coefficient of each 
year dummy suggests the effects of each year on the IDO enactment rate compared with 
1999. All the coefficients of the year dummies show the significant positive sign. Further, 
its absolute values increase steadily as the number of years pass. This reflects an 
increase in the rate of enactment of IDOs, which is shown as a growing trend plotted in 
Figure 1. 
 
5.2. IV-Tobit model. 
 
As is discussed earlier, Government size appears to be an endogenous variable. 
However, the Wald test of exogeneity is required to determine whether Government size 
is indeed an endogenous variable (Wooldridge 2002, p. 472–477).9 In Table 4(1), the test 
of endogeneity rejected the null hypothesis that Government size is exogenous in all 
columns, meaning that Government size is considered an endogenous variable. And so, 
a IV-Tobit model is preferred to control for endogeneity bias caused by Government size. 
Table 4(1) provides the results of an over-identification test.10 This test is necessary to 
check the validity of the estimation results in the IV-Tobit model. The null hypothesis of 
the over-identification test is that the instrumental variables do not correlate with the 
residuals. If the hypothesis is not rejected, the instrumental variables are valid. Table 
4(1) shows that the hypothesis is not rejected in columns (1) and (2), suggesting that the 
estimation results are valid. However, in column (3), the hypothesis is rejected. 
Therefore, the results of columns (1) and (2) are more reliable than column (3).11  
In all columns of Table 4(1), the coefficients of Political group and Cooperative group, 
as anticipated, are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Controlling for 
endogeneity bias makes the results of Political group and Cooperative group to be 
                                                   
9 For the maximum likelihood variant with a single endogenous variable, the test is 
simply a Wald test where the correlation parameter rho is equal to zero. That is, the test 
simply asks whether the error terms in the structural equation and the reduced-form 
equation for the endogenous variable are correlated.  
10 An Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-square statistic is used for the 
over-identification test. 
11 It should be noted that special care should be taken in the interpretation of the 
results in column (3). 
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robust to alternative specifications and in line with the expectation. From this, I derive 
the argument that interest groups hamper the enactment of IDOs in order to benefit 
from the information asymmetry between government and citizens. This strongly 
supports Hypothesis 1. In addition, Government party continues to yield the negative 
sign. It is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (2), although it is 
statistically insignificant in column (3). This suggests that the results in Table 3 
regarding Government party are, to a certain extent, robust. This is also consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. The values of the coefficients vary according to the specifications. Hence, I 
interpret them by focusing on the full model presented in column (1) because omitted 
variables bias is alleviated by incorporating all dependent variables. The absolute 
values of Political group and Cooperative group are 2.98 and 2.68, respectively. I 
interpret these results as implying the following: an increase of 1 in the number of 
political groups per 1000 persons leads to a 2.98% point decrease in the rate of IDO 
enactment. An increase of 1 in the number of cooperative groups per 1000 persons leads 
to 2.68% point decrease in rate of IDO enactment. The absolute value of Government 
party is 0.50, meaning that a 1% point increase in seats of the LDP leads to a 0.50% 
point decrease in rate of IDO enactment. 
With respect to Government size, it is surprising to observe that the coefficients of 
Government size become positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
estimations, which is in contrast to the results presented in Table 3. That is, 
endogeneity bias is considered to markedly influence the results of Government size. 
Furthermore, the values of its coefficients range between 5.41 and 18.2—this represents 
a significant gap. Columns (2) and (3) possibly suffer from omitted variables bias 
although the effect of collinearity is alleviated. Hence, I now focus on the full model 
shown in column (1) to interpret the magnitude of the effect of Government size. As 
shown in column (1), the value 18.2 can be interpreted as suggesting that a 1% point 
increase in expenditure of government over GDP leads to a 18.2% point increase in the 
rate of IDO enactment. Hence, citizens are thought to be very sensitive to government 
size.  
As for the control variables, the sign of Female rate varies according to specifications 
and is not statistically significant. Hence, Female rate does not influence IDOs. The 
significant positive sign of Ln(GDP) in all columns implies that GDP per capital makes 
a contribution to increase the enactment rate of IDOs. As shown in column (1), the 
coefficient of Ln(GDP) is 2.90, meaning that a 1% point increase in GDP per capita leads 
to 2.90% point increase in the rate of IDO enactments. This shows that economic 
development leads to a transparent government, suggesting a positive association 
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between economic development and democracy. Contrary to Table 3, the sign of the 
coefficient of Education takes the positive sign in columns (1)–(3). This is consistent 
with the expectation. However, Education does not show statistical significance. 
Therefore, effect of Education is not conclusive.  
I now turn my attention to the results of the first stage results shown in Table 4(2). 
With regard to the instrumental variables, the sign of the coefficient of Old population is 
positive in all estimations and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (2) 
and (3), whereas that for Young population is negative in columns (1) and (2) and 
positive in column (3). Hence, older populations are considered to prefer larger 
governments and therefore increase government size, while households with 
school-aged children do not influence government size. It is interesting to observe that 
Political group and Cooperative group yield positive signs and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all estimations. It follows from this that special interest 
groups are devoted to increasing government size, which is consistent with Mueller and 
Murrell (1986). They describe how parties supply interest groups with favors in 
exchange for the interest groups’ support in the political process. If these favors take the 
form of goods targeted to specific interest groups, there is possibly a positive externality 
that favors other groups. In this case, the government will grow larger.12 
Taken together therefore, the combined results of Tables 3 and 4 suggest that 
interest groups impede information disclosure from government and increase 
government size to increase the benefits for their members.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
According to Olson (1982), an interest group will lobby for preferential policies for its 
members at the expense of the rest of society. The role of interest groups is reinforced by 
information asymmetry between government and citizens, causing government failures. 
In other words, government failure can be alleviated when citizens are able to share 
information with their government. However, sharing information concerning public 
spending between citizens and government appears to reduce the vested interest of 
interest groups. This may lead interest groups to rigorously oppose enactment of IDOs. 
                                                   
12 The following argument is noteworthy: ―some interest groups favor higher 
government expenditures (automobile and truck drivers want larger highway 
expenditure), but others favor lower expenditures (environmental groups oppose 
highway construction). Everyone prefers to receive higher subsidies, but to pay lower 
taxes… The net effect of interest groups on the size of government cannot be determined 
a priori. It is an empirical question‖(Mueller 2003, p. 521). 
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In addition, government size is thought to play a critical role in the formation of public 
policy, such as the enactment of IDOs. This paper examined the effects of interest 
groups and government size on the enactment of IDOs using a local government level 
dataset from Japan. Government size can be considered as an endogenous variable, 
leading to estimation bias. I used a IV-tobit model to control for any endogeneity bias 
caused by including government size as an independent variable. The major findings 
are summarized as follows: (1) special interest groups have a detrimental effect on 
information disclosure; (2) special interest groups and an aged population act to 
increase government size; and (3) information disclosure ordinances are more likely to 
be enacted by a larger government.  
The primary contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the role of interest groups is 
explored in the political process where IDOs are enacted. This study provides a definite 
understanding of the effect of groups on the choice of public policy. Second, this paper 
examines not only the effects of government size on information disclosure policy but 
also the influence of groups on government size. From the results shown in this paper I 
derive the argument that interest groups put pressure on governments to impede any 
policy that reduces the benefits to those groups in the process of information disclosure 
concerning public issues. Therefore, the continuation of an inefficient political system is 
caused, in part, by the endeavors of interest groups to pursue their own benefits. 
However, the role played by interest groups to determine government size (Mueller 
2003, p. 521) and influence policy-making appears to depend on the features and aims of 
the groups. Therefore, a more detailed classification of groups is required to explore 
their influence on government size and the enactment of IDOs. In addition, this paper 
did not investigate the effect of IDOs on corruption in the public sector and economic 
efficiency, although IDOs are intended to increase the welfare of all society. It would be 
worthwhile to investigate the effect of IDOs in these areas to determine the various 
policy implications. These remaining issues can be addressed in future work. 
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Fig. 1 Rates of enactment for municipalities of government information disclosure 
ordinances. 
1 The rate would become 1 if all local governments enacted the ordinances. 
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Fig. 2(1) Relation between political groups and rates of municipalities enacting 
government information disclosure ordinances 
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Fig. 2(2) Relation between cooperative associations and rates of municipalities enacting 
government information-disclosure ordinances 
 
 
Note: These relations are obtained after controlling for unobserved year-specific effects 
and are illustrated using the avplot command in STATA 11.  
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Fig. 3(1) Relation between government size and rate of old population 
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Fig. 3(2) Relation between government size and rate of young population 
 
Note: These relations are obtained after controlling for unobserved year-specific effects 
and are illustrated using the avplot command in STATA 11.  
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Table 1. Variable definitions and basic statistics 
1 Data were collected from the Asahi Shimbun newspaper (2008) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics 
Bureau (various years). 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Max Min 
Information 
disclosure 
Rates of municipalities enacting government information disclosure ordinances 
(municipalities enacting ordinances/all municipalities) 
0.70 0.28 1.00 0.01 
Government 
size 
Government expenditure/ GDP 0.13 0.04 0.29 0.05 
Political 
group 
Number of political and business organizations associations per population  
(number of political and business organizations/1,000 persons) 
0.35 0.11 0.56 0.09 
Cooperative 
group 
Number of cooperatives per population 
(number of cooperative associations/1,000 persons) 
0.31 0.13 0.74 0.07 
Government 
party 
Rate of the Liberal Democratic party (number of seats/all seats in a local 
assembly) 
0.49 0.13 0.75 0.09 
Female rate 
 
Rate of female population 0.51 0.01 0.54 0.48 
GDP  
 
GDP per capita (in millions of yen) 0.03 0.007 0.07 0.02 
Education 
 
Rate of university graduation 0.10 0.03 0.24 0.05 
Old 
population 
Rate of population over 65 years old 0.19 0.02 0.26 0.11 
Young 
population 
Rate of population between 5 and19 years old 0.16 0.01 0.21 0.12 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of variables used in estimations 
 Information 
disclosure 
Government 
size 
Political 
group 
Cooperative 
group 
Government 
party 
Female 
rate 
GDP  
 
Education 
 
Old 
population 
Young 
population 
Information 
disclosure 
1.00          
Government 
size 
–0.33*** 1.00         
Political 
group 
–0.06 0.62*** 1.00        
Cooperative 
group 
–0.21*** 0.75*** 0.66*** 1.00       
Government 
party 
–0.13** 0.10* –0.06 0.22*** 1.00      
Female rate 
 
–0.19*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.55*** 0.16*** 1.00     
GDP  
 
0.20*** –0.52*** 0.007 –0.27*** –0.09* –0.38*** 1.00    
Education 
 
0.28*** –0.67*** –0.44*** –0.62*** –0.18*** –0.45*** 0.52*** 1.00   
Old 
population 
0.20*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.79*** 0.25*** 0.63*** –0.26*** –0.54*** 1.00  
Young 
population 
–0.60*** 0.34*** 0.16*** 0.14** 0.02 0.26*** –0.45*** –0.52*** –0.15*** 1.00 
 
1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3. Tobit model 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Government  
size 
   –1.25** 
(–2.40) 
–1.11** 
(–2.42) 
–1.52*** 
(–3.24) 
Political 
group 
–0.36** 
(–2.43) 
–0.41*** 
(–3.19) 
 –0.18 
(–1.11) 
–0.16 
(–1.02) 
 
Cooperative 
group 
–0.09 
(–0.66) 
 –0.26** 
(–2.15) 
0.09 
(0.57) 
 0.05 
(0.38) 
Government 
party 
–0.50*** 
(–5.22) 
–0.52*** 
(–5.59) 
–0.42*** 
(–4.62) 
–0.51*** 
(–5.29) 
–0.50*** 
(–5.32) 
–0.48*** 
(–5.18) 
Female rate 
 
0.58 
(0.47) 
0.46 
(0.37) 
–0.47 
(–0.40) 
0.39 
(0.32) 
0.50 
(0.42) 
-0.07 
(-0.06) 
Ln(GDP)  
 
0.51*** 
(5.75) 
0.51*** 
(5.78) 
0.43*** 
(5.16) 
0.34*** 
(3.10) 
0.36*** 
(3.37) 
0.28*** 
(2.97) 
Education 
 
–1.06** 
(–2.06) 
–0.96* 
(–1.96) 
–0.80 
(–1.56) 
–1.16** 
(–2.26) 
–1.23** 
(–2.46) 
–1.07** 
(–2.11) 
Year_1999 
 
                  <Reference group>  
Year_2000 
 
0.17*** 
(4.55) 
0.17*** 
(4.45) 
0.17*** 
(4.40) 
0.17*** 
(4.45) 
0.17*** 
(4.47) 
0.17*** 
(4.40) 
Year_2001 
 
0.38*** 
(9.92) 
0.37*** 
(9.75) 
0.37*** 
(9.66) 
0.37*** 
(9.75) 
0.38*** 
(9.78) 
0.37*** 
(9.66) 
Year_2002 
 
0.55*** 
(14.0) 
0.54*** 
(13.6) 
0.53*** 
(13.5) 
0.54*** 
(13.6) 
0.54*** 
(13.6) 
0.53*** 
(13.5) 
Year_2003 
 
0.62*** 
(15.5) 
0.60*** 
(14.9) 
0.59*** 
(15.0) 
0.60*** 
(14.9) 
0.61*** 
(14.9) 
0.59*** 
(15.0) 
Year_2004 
 
0.67*** 
(16.1) 
0.64*** 
(15.3) 
0.63*** 
(15.6) 
0.64*** 
(15.4) 
0.64*** 
(15.4) 
0.63*** 
(15.6) 
Constant 
 
2.25*** 
(3.79) 
2.31*** 
(3.93) 
2.39*** 
(4.00) 
1.87*** 
(3.07) 
1.87*** 
(3.07) 
1.85*** 
(3.03) 
Log likelihood 
 
23.5 23.3 20.6 26.3 26.2 25.7 
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Observations 
 
281 281 281 281 281 281 
Censored 
observations 
45 45 45 45 45 45 
1 Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
Table 4(1). IV-Tobit model  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Government  
size 
18.2*** 
(2.72) 
5.41*** 
(3.68) 
10.2*** 
(2.63) 
Political 
group 
–2.98*** 
(–2.86) 
–1.58*** 
(–4.32) 
 
Cooperative group –2.69*** 
(–2.86) 
 –2.40*** 
(–2.83) 
Government party –0.61*** 
(–2.59) 
–0.72*** 
(–5.47) 
–0.18 
(–0.95) 
Female rate 
 
2.73 
(0.85) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
–3.58 
(–1.50) 
Ln(GDP)  
 
2.90*** 
(3.19) 
1.24*** 
(5.36) 
1.45*** 
(3.47) 
Education 
 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.24 
(0.33) 
0.94 
(0.84) 
Year_1999 
 
<Reference group>  
Year_2000 
 
0.25** 
(2.50) 
0.19*** 
(3.80) 
0.21*** 
(2.98) 
Year_2001 
 
0.52*** 
(4.75) 
0.42*** 
(8.03) 
0.43*** 
(5.88) 
Year_2002 
 
0.78*** 
(6.07) 
0.63*** 
(11.2) 
0.63*** 
(8.09) 
Year_2003 
 
0.93*** 
(6.25) 
0.73*** 
(12.1) 
0.72*** 
(8.76) 
Year_2004 
 
1.00*** 
(6.32) 
0.78*** 
(12.5) 
0.76*** 
(9.10) 
Constant 
 
8.17*** 
(3.13) 
4.56*** 
(4.65) 
6.31*** 
(3.48) 
Wald chi-square 
 
89.7 298.0 160.8 
Exogeneity test 
 
64.3 
(P-value = 
0.00) 
49.0 
(P-value = 
0.00) 
32.4 
(P-value = 0.00) 
Overidentification 
test 
0.25 
(P-value = 
0.61) 
1.15 
(P-value = 
0.28) 
7.91 
(P-value = 0.00) 
Observations 
 
281 281 281 
Censored 
observations 
45 45 45 
1 Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4 (2). IV-Tobit model (first stage): 
 Government size is a dependent variable 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Old population 0.24 
(1.64) 
0.65*** 
(5.11) 
0.57*** 
(3.67) 
Young population –0.20 
(–1.03) 
–0.06 
(–0.33) 
0.39* 
(1.91) 
Political 
group 
0.14*** 
(7.94) 
0.17*** 
(9.26) 
 
Cooperative 
group 
0.10*** 
(4.86) 
 0.15*** 
(6.60) 
Government 
party 
0.002 
(0.22) 
0.008 
(0.73) 
–0.03*** 
(–2.95) 
Female rate 
 
–0.31* 
(–1.75) 
–0.55*** 
(–3.04) 
–0.19 
(–0.99) 
Ln(GDP)  
 
–0.14*** 
(–12.9) 
–0.14*** 
(–12.9) 
–0.10*** 
(–9.48) 
Education 
 
–0.05 
(–0.75) 
–0.03 
(–0.39) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
Year_1999 
 
<Reference group>  
Year_2000 
 
–0.005 
(–1.28) 
–0.007 
(–1.55) 
–0.005 
(–1.17) 
Year_2001 
 
–0.01** 
(–2.38) 
–0.01** 
(–3.05) 
–0.09* 
(–1.77) 
Year_2002 
 
–0.01*** 
(–3.74) 
–0.02*** 
(–5.07) 
–0.01*** 
(–2.93) 
Year_2003 
 
–0.02*** 
(–4.64) 
–0.03*** 
(–6.71) 
–0.02*** 
(–3.55) 
Year_2004 
 
–0.02*** 
(–4.96) 
–0.04*** 
(–7.54) 
–0.02*** 
(–3.78) 
Constant 
 
–0.25*** 
(–3.61) 
–0.23*** 
(–3.16) 
–0.30*** 
(–3.91) 
F-test 
 
86.7 
(P-value = 
0.00) 
84.8 
(P-value = 
0.00) 
72.0 
(P-value = 
0.00) 
Observations 
 
281 281 281 
1 Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
